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On the Priority of Believing: A Response to Teresa Morgan 
 
(Quaestiones disputatae, SNTS Annual Meeting, Pretoria, August 2017) 
 
Francis Watson, Durham University, UK 
 
 
In her remarkable book on πίστις and fides in Graeco-Roman culture and the New Testament, 
Teresa Morgan emphasizes that for Christian and non-Christian alike πίστις most 
fundamentally has to do with trust in the context of interpersonal relationships.1 Christians are 
unusual in the way they project trust and trustworthiness into the sphere of the human 
relationship with the divine, but they do not assign new semantic content to this terminology. 
What Morgan has to say about Paul is typical of her emphases throughout her long book: 
 
Paul’s main interest is in pistis as relationship-forming... As such, he sees πίστις as 
predominantly an exercise of trust which involves heart, mind, and action. Like all 
trust, it is intimately connected with belief, on which it depends and which depends on 
it. That certain things are true, such as that Christ died for human sins and was raised 
from the dead, is integral to Paul’s preaching, and he undoubtedly wants those to 
whom he preaches to believe them. But this kind of belief is not the essence of Paul’s 
preaching nor of Christian pistis.2 
 
We have here a classicist’s version of a familiar hierarchy: a privileging of the 
personal relationship of trust over so-called ‘propositional’ beliefs that are somehow both 
integral and non-essential.3 I propose here to invert that hierarchy: for Paul and other early 
Christians, beliefs come first. These beliefs are credal, shaping individual and communal 
identity; the term ‘propositional’ is inappropriate here.4 These beliefs are also counter-
intuitive. Those who are dead and buried do not return to bodily life. Yet Jesus did so, and we 
too shall rise bodily when he comes in glory with the clouds, manifesting a lordship over all 
things that at present remains hidden. Because such beliefs are prima facie so implausible, 
they must be asserted and inculcated all the more forcefully.5 
 
                                                          
1 Teresa Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Rom,an Empire and Early 
Churches (Oxford: OUP, 2015). 
2 Roman Faith, 261. 
3 Morgan’s approach to her entire topic focuses not on ‘the propositional content of a proclamation’ but on 
‘the unique shape of trust… as it operates in a community and discourses about that community’ (Roman 
Faith, 23; italics original).  In contrast, it is said that theology and other disciplines ‘typically focus on 
propositional belief rather than on relationships involving both belief and trust’ (24). 
4 A ‘proposition’ is the (true or false) assertion that X is the case, without reference to the speaker’s self-
involvement in the speech-act of asserting. To describe the credal affirmation that ‘Christ is risen’ as a 
‘proposition’ is to put it on a level with ‘dogs are quadrupeds’  or ‘cats have nine lives’.  
5 The priority of believing might also be demonstrated from the Gospel of John, where πιστεύειν occurs 98 
times and πίστις not at all. Pace Morgan (Roman Faith, 394–96), this need not be viewed as an anomaly 
requiring elaborate explanation.  
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Believing is the intended perlocutionary effect of preaching; preaching and believing are 
correlates. ‘So we preach and you believed’, says Paul after summarizing the common 
apostolic gospel in a series of credal affirmations about Christ crucified, buried, and risen (1 
Cor 15.1–11).6  Paul preached and the Corinthians believed (ἐπιστεύσατε, v. 11), although if 
what Paul preached was untrue then their believing or ‘faith’ was in vain (κενὴ καὶ ἡ πίστις 
ὑμῶν, v. 14; cf. v. 17).7 Here as elsewhere in Paul, the substantive πίστις is rooted in the act 
of πιστεύειν, an act so comprehensive in its scope that those who have responded positively 
to the Pauline credo can be described simply as οἱ πιστεύοντες (1 Cor.1.21; 14.22) while 
πίστις can serve as a metonym for the entire content of Christian preaching and teaching 
(Gal.1.23). 
 
In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul reasserts one fundamental yet counter-intuitive Christian claim (the 
bodily resurrection of the dead) by appealing to another (the resurrection of Jesus on the third 
day). Initially, the credibility of belief in Jesus’ resurrection is established by way of an 
appeal to collective apostolic authority (vv. 5, 7–11), to the sheer number of eyewitnesses (v. 
8), and to the devastating implications of an un-resurrected Jesus for the Corinthians 
themselves (vv. 12–19). It is from this platform that Paul launches his attack on the 
Corinthian sceptics for whom a renewed post mortem bodily existence is a belief too far. A 
future bodily resurrection is necessarily entailed in the resurrection of Jesus, its first-fruits 
(vv. 20, 23), and the resurrection of Jesus is necessarily entailed in our Christian faith. If we 
are Christian, we must affirm and we must not question the claim that bodily resurrection is 
the telos of our own lives: that is Paul’s argument, and from one perspective it is precisely an 
argument about the nature of πίστις. There is no explicit reference to human trust in God or 
the divine trustworthiness; πίστις has to do with the eschatological destiny of the world as 
disclosed in the raising of Jesus. If this counter-intuitive ‘faith’ fails to persuade the sceptics, 
Paul has other arguments to support it, derived from the created order.  The seed that is dead 
and buried yet rises transformed is not just a parable of the resurrection but a demonstration 
of its plausibility (vv. 36–38, 42–44). If God can give life to a seed, why not also to a corpse? 
While the ‘body’ of the plant remains rooted in the earth, we should also recall that the 
cosmos is populated by an abundance of different bodies, including heavenly ones each with 
its own distinctive glory (vv. 39–41). If the creator of heaven and earth already has an 
impressive track record in conjuring glorious bodies out of non-being, how can we doubt his 
ability to do so in the eschaton? Doubt or scepticism is the existential threat to faith that Paul 
                                                          
6 In the TDNT article on πίστευω κτλ, R. Bultmann rightly views ‘πίστις as acceptance of the Kerygma’ as the 
specifically Christian understanding of πίστις, in contrast to the primary sense of ‘trust’ conveyed by both 
Greek and Jewish usage. See G. Kittel and G. Friedrich (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 
(10 vols., Eng. tr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964–76, 6.174–228), 6.208. The emphasis here on a distinctive 
Christian usage contrasts with Morgan’s emphasis on convergence, and should not be too quickly dismissed 
as reflecting ‘theological bias’. 
7 Loss of this correlation of faith and preaching is one of a number of problems with the subjective genitive 
reading of Paul’s prepositional πίστις Χριστοῦ clauses, according to which the πίστις in question is that of 
Christ himself. Commenting on the Pauline ἑκ πίστεως, Morgan combines this reading with others: ‘By 
leaving pistis unqualified, Paul allows it to refer equally and simultaneously to the pistis of God towards 
Christ and humanity and that of Christ towards God and humanity which make dikaosynē possible, and that of 
the human being towards God and Christ’ (Roman Faith, 276). 
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combats here, and the faith that is threatened is a core Christian belief about the nature of 
eschatological destiny. 
 
Some decades later, Paul’s argument about faith, doubt, and resurrection is revisited by the 
author of 1 Clement, this time with an explicit appeal to divine faithfulness or 
trustworthiness. (Parenthetically, it should be noted that this text lies outside the scope of 
Teresa Morgan’s work, since she assumes that the literature of earliest Christianity is 
coextensive with the New Testament in its present form. In reality, the exact contents of this 
anthology of early Christian literature continued to be uncertain long after Athanasius first  
advocated the 27 book version familiar to ourselves.8 There is no reason to suppose that 
Athanasius’s selection corresponds to any fundamental chronological or qualitative 
distinction within  Christian writings from c. 50–150 CE. To speak of a ‘New Testament’ as 
already existing in this period is an anachronism – a point so obvious that it is generally 
overlooked.) 
 
Following the Pauline precedent, the author of 1 Clement finds the basis for belief in the 
future resurrection in the raising of Jesus as its firstfruits (1 Clem 24.1), while also appealing 
to phenomena of the created order to show that resurrection really is credible.9 ‘Day and night 
show us resurrection’, and so do crops (24.3–5). Above all, there is the phoenix, that unique 
Arabian bird that lives for 500 years and then generates its successor from its own decaying 
corpse, which is then dutifully conveyed to Heliopolis so that the latest miraculous renewal 
can be entered into the age-old Egyptian priestly records.10 Clement’s conclusion is as follows 
(key phrases are in bold): 
 
Μέγα καὶ θαυμαστὸν οὖν νομίζομεν εἶναι εἰ ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν ἁπάντων ἀνάστασιν 
ποιήσεται τῶν ὁσίως αὐτῷ δουλευσάντων ἐν πεποιθήσει πίστεως ἀγαθῆς, ὅπου καὶ 
δι’ ὀρνέου δείκνυσιν ἡμῖν τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς ἐπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ; ... Ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ 
                                                          
8 In his 39th “Festal Letter” from 367. Text in S. Athanase Lettres Festale et Pastorales en Copte, ed. L.-Th. 
Lefort, CSCO 150 (Coptic, 16–22, 58–62) and 151 (French translation and Greek fragment, 31–40); R.-G. 
Coquin, “Les lettres festales d'Athanase (CPG 2102). Un nouveau complement: Le manuscrit IFAO, copte 
25”,  OLP 15 (1984), 133–58. See David Brakke, “Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-Century 
Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria's Thirty-Ninth ‘Festal Letter’ (HTR 87 (1994), 394–419); “A New Fragment 
of Athanasius’s Thirty-Ninth Festal Letter: Heresy, Apocrypha, and the Canon” (HTR 103 (2010), 47–66, 
including a full English translation and the Coptic text of a new fragment). The listing of the 27 book New 
Testament occurs at 39.18 (using Brakke’s paragraph enumeration); Greek text, CSCO 151, 35. 
9 On the close relationship between 1 Clement and 1 Corinthians see Andrew F. Gregory, ‘1 Clement and the 
Writings that later formed the New Testament’ (in A. Gregory and C. Tuckett (ed.), The Reception of the New 
Testament in the Apostolic Fathers, Oxford: OUP, 2005, 129–57), 144–51; Clare K. Rothschild, New Essays 
on the Apostolic Fathers (WUNT 375, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 35–60. Rothschild’s argument for 
regarding 1 Clement as a pseudepigraphon should also be noted (61–68). 
10 In the later and better known version of the phoenix legend, the phoenix immolates itself and its successor 
arises from the ashes. On the two versions, see R. van den Broek, The Myth of the Phoenix according to 
Classical and Early Christian Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 146–61. Van den Broek rightly notes that the 
Coptic translation of 1 Clement conflates both versions of the legend (156); text in Carl Schmidt, Der erste 
Clemensbrief in altkoptischer Übersetzung (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1908), 74. For a collection of ancient 
passages on the phoenix, see A. Lindemann,  Die Clemensbriefe (HNT 17, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992),  
263–77; for a careful recent analysis of 1 Clement 25, Rothschild, New Essays, 97–110. 
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ἐλπίδι προσδεδέσθωσαν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν τῷ πιστῷ ἐν ταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ 
ἐν τοῖς κρίμασιν 
 
Should we find it great or surprising if the creator of all things is to bring about a 
resurrection of those who have served him in holiness and in the confidence of a good 
faith, when he demonstrates the greatness of his promise through a bird?... In this 
hope, then, may our souls be bound to the one who is faithful in his promises and 
righteous in his judgments.11 
 
 Here it is clearer than in Paul that belief in the future bodily resurrection has its 
natural habitat within a form of life characterized by holiness and a personal relationship of 
πίστις towards one who is πιστός, justified trust in a trustworthy deity. Yet credal belief 
remains fundamental here too. The trust in question is quite specific, consisting in the 
conviction that the God who in Jesus’ resurrection promises the bodily resurrection of all will 
in due time fulfil that promise. It is that counter-intuitive belief – a belief in the resurrection 
of Jesus construed  as a divine promise – that engenders the relationship of trust. Trust is 
oriented not towards an abstract creator deity but towards a God who has made a promise 
with a specific content in a specific way. That promise and that content can be articulated in 
verbal and indeed credal form, and it is the credal belief that forms the basis of interpersonal 
trust – and not the reverse. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 1 Clem 26.1. In an informative and engaging article on the reception of 1 Clement and its phoenix on their 
arrival (through Codex Alexandrinus) in 17th century England, M. Himuro questions unnecessarily whether 
‘Clement’ himself believed the phoenix legend (‘The Phoenix in The First Epistle of Clement to the 
Corinthians’ (Renaissance Studies 12 (1998), 523–44; 531). Himuro’s article also includes valuable 
discussion of patristic interest in the phoenix, initiated by 1 Clement. 
